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Abstract 
This study examines the proposition that secondary school choice in 
England has produced a stratified education system, compared with a 
counterfactual world where pupils are allocated into schools based strictly 
on proximity via a simulation that exploits the availability of pupil 
postcodes in the National Pupil Database. The study finds current levels of 
sorting in the English secondary school system – defined as pupils who do 
not attend their proximity allocation school – to be around 50 per cent, but 
estimates that only one-in-five pupils are potentially active in sorting 
between non-faith comprehensive schools. School segregation is almost 
always lower in the proximity counterfactual than in the actual data, 
confirming that where pupils are sorting themselves into a non-proximity 
school, it does tend to increase social and ability segregation. The difference 
between school and residential segregation is greatest in urban areas and 
LEAs with many pupils in grammar and voluntary-aided schools. 
Background 
Government policies, introduced from 1988 onwards, that seek to influence 
the allocation of pupils to secondary schools in England are among the most 
contentious aspects of education policy today.  These policies introduced a 
‘quasi-market’ (Glennerster, 1991) for schools in England by increasing the 
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ability of parents to exercise choice and giving more schools control over 
their admissions criteria.  The policies, all of which weaken the link between 
place of residence and school attended, were introduced as a route to 
improving standards by increasing the autonomy of schools and 
encouraging competition for pupils via parental choice. 
Research has not been able to show how much these policies have 
systematically altered the allocation of pupils to schools in Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) across England.  This study addresses this question by 
comparing the current allocation of pupils to schools to a simulation where 
pupils are allocated into schools based strictly on proximity, while 
maintaining current school capacities.  This is possible with the availability 
of pupil postcodes (zip codes), collected annually from schools since 2001.  
The extent to which pupils do not attend their proximity school measures 
current pupil mobility, which indicates the potential extent of choice 
exercised by parents.  The simulation also helps us understand how this 
pupil mobility affects the stratification of pupils across schools. 
Prior to 1988, LEAs had a duty to have regard to the general principle that 
children should be educated according to the wishes of parents under 
Section 76 of the Butler Education Act of 1944, but this was a weak 
directive given the concurrent requirement to use resources efficiently (Fitz 
et al., 2001).  Though some English LEAs introduced parental choice much 
earlier, the 1980 Education Act and 1988 Education Reform Act enshrined 
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the parental right to exercise a preference for a particular school.  The 
introduction of locally assessed admissions numbers for each school’s 
enrolment meant that LEAs could no longer refuse to meet preferences for 
particular schools unless that number of places had been filled and it is now 
easier for schools to expand capacity (though only 120 secondary schools 
have since 1999 (Select Committee for Education & Skills, 2005)). 
The quasi-market enabled schools to opt out of LEA control and institute 
autonomous admissions procedures and budgets by becoming Grant 
Maintained (GM) schools (most of which later became foundation schools), 
with some introducing partial ability selection.  30% of schools now 
determine their own admissions, compared to 15% in 1988 (West & 
Pennell, 2003).  The Specialist Schools programme reinforced the rationale 
of parental choice by encouraging diversity of schools, and again these 
schools were able to select 10% of pupils by aptitude.  Though catchment 
areas or distance to school oversubscription criteria have roles of continuing 
significance in most of the country (Jowett, 1995; Mayet, 1996), the quasi-
market for school places in England, rightly or wrongly, became associated 
with schools choosing pupils as much as parents choosing schools. 
The principal concern for critics of the school choice policies is that they 
may be inequitable and lead to increasing school stratification (defined as 
the unevenness in the distribution of pupils of certain characteristics across 
schools), for two reasons.  First, competition gives schools an incentive to 
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boost their league table position by selecting, or ‘cream-skimming’, pupils 
on the basis of ability or covert social criteria.  West et al.’s (2004) analysis 
of comprehensive secondary school admissions criteria in England reveals a 
significant minority of (mostly voluntary-aided and foundation) schools 
using criteria which appear to be designed to select a certain group of pupils 
and so exclude others: 
 Admissions criteria relating to ability/aptitude were mentioned by 
11.2% of foundation schools, 6.5% of voluntary-aided schools and 
0.3% of community schools. 
 Ability banding by schools for selection purposes was found to be 
more prevalent in voluntary-aided / foundation schools (5%) than 
community schools (2%), with evidence of uneven bands being used 
by some schools, which allow higher abilities to be over-represented. 
 13% of schools (92% of voluntary-aided schools) in West et al.’s 
sample used religious criteria to admit pupils; some used interviews 
to ‘assess religious or denomination commitment’ (DfEE, 1999), 
which can be used as a device for covert cream-skimming. 
The second argument why choice might increase school stratification is that 
families of lower socio-economic backgrounds will be disadvantaged in 
their ability to access the ‘best’ schools; this may be for reasons of financial 
or time constraint, or they may lack the information to employ a successful 
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school choice strategy.  There are now a large number of research studies 
across many countries concluding that there is a strong association between 
social class and school choice (e.g. Gewirtz et al., 1995; Hastings et al., 
2005; Waslander & Thrupp, 1995; Zanten, 1996).  There are many well-
founded explanations for this association which are not explored further in 
this paper.  Crucially though, there is evidence that parents tend to consider 
the ‘best’ schools to be those with a high mean pupil ability and socio-
economic status (e.g. Ladd, 2002; Willms & Echols, 1992).  This strategy 
appears rational, not least because the ability of peers influences individual 
pupil attainment (Feinstein & Symons, 1999; Robertson & Symons, 2003; 
Zimmer & Toma, 2000), and suggests that those who successfully elect not 
to attend their neighbourhood school will be attempting to access a superior 
peer group. 
The question of whether school choice policies in England have increased 
stratification between schools is an empirical question; but the gradual 
introduction of the policies on a national basis and the lack of historical 
pupil-level data have made it difficult to use simple longitudinal or cross-
sectional comparisons to measure a causal relationship between policy 
implementation and school stratification.  Based on current evidence, it is 
not possible to argue that the average level of school segregation in an LEA 
has substantially risen, or indeed fallen, since 1988 (Allen & Vignoles, 
2006; Goldstein & Noden, 2003; Gorard et al., 2003; Noden, 2000).  
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However, there is clearer evidence that grammar schools and own-
admissions authority schools are associated with greater levels of school 
segregation, measured using free school meals eligibility as an indicator of 
low income (Allen & Vignoles, 2006; Goldstein & Noden, 2003; Gorard et 
al., 2003).  More significantly, two studies have now shown that LEAs with 
a greater proportion of pupils in voluntary-aided schools have experienced 
greater growth in segregation between 1994 and 1999 (Goldstein & Noden, 
2003) and between 1999 and 2004 (Allen & Vignoles, 2006).  Goldstein and 
Noden find a similar pattern for foundation and grammar schools; Allen and 
Vignoles (using the later data) do not. 
Because this study compares school segregation to a counterfactual 
proximity allocation of pupils, it is similar in its strengths and limitations to 
Burgess et al. (2006).  They try to explain why the magnitude of the 
difference between residential and school segregation (‘post-residential 
sorting’) differs substantially between LEAs.  This study moves beyond the 
scope of their work by analysing the role of own-admissions authority 
schools in contributing to sorting and also overcomes important 
methodological concerns regarding a random allocation bias on their 
measure of post-residential sorting (discussion in the method section). 
Unfortunately, the simulated proximity allocation used in this study, while 
insightful in certain respects, is a poor proxy for the real world experiment 
for one principal reason: if we abandoned school choice and non-proximity 
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admissions criteria in England today, we would expect some reallocation in 
the housing market as parents move house to attempt to achieve their 
desired choice of school.  In other words, residential levels of segregation 
are endogenous to the policies under examination in this study.  Empirical 
studies in the US and UK have shown that good schools do cause house 
prices to rise, (Black, 1999; Gibbons & Machin, 2003, 2006; Leech & 
Campos, 2001), but no estimates exist as to the size of the endogeneity bias 
on residential segregation in our data.  Specifically, it is not clear the extent 
to which school choice reduces the need of parents to locate close to a good 
school, given the outcome of the English school choice process is highly 
uncertain for a family.  This means that when an association between a 
policy and the size of post-residential sorting is measured, we can go no 
further than infer that the policy has increased school segregation or reduced 
residential segregation (or both). 
Data 
Data for English school pupils is drawn from the National Pupil Database 
(NPD).  This combines attainment data for pupils in Key Stage tests at ages 
7, 11, 14 and 16 with a limited range of pupil characteristics, collected from 
schools in January each year.  The 463,117 pupils in this analysis were in 
year 9 (age 13/14) in 2002/3.  Using a cohort in year 9 (rather than year 7) 
has the advantages that it means every student in England will have 
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completed the secondary admissions process,
1
 though there is a risk that the 
pupil has moved house since year 7 so the postcode used in this study will 
not relate to residential location at the point choice was made.  Though the 
dataset could be considered to be a population rather than a sample, certain 
pupils do not form part of this study (namely those at private schools, 
special schools, hospital schools, detention centres, all boarders, pupils on 
the Isles of Scilly and Isle of Wight).  Key descriptors of all variables used 
in this study are in Table 1. 
The main drawback of using NPD is that it does not provide a good 
indicator of the socio-economic status of the child, so this study relies on 
eligibility for free school meals (FSM) as an indicator of low income.
2
  
Richer geo-demographic data such as Indices of Multiple Deprivation and 
Acorn household type indicators are available via the pupil postcode in 
NPD, but these refer to the average characteristics of the street or area and 
not the family characteristics directly, which renders them unusable for this 
study.  For example, the presence of a faith school in a town might allow a 
church-going family to purchase a less expensive house in the catchment 
area for a community school with a deprived intake, knowing that their 
children would attend the faith school.  Geo-demographic data is therefore 
likely to systematically underestimate the socio-economic characteristics of 
this family, thus biasing all parameters of interest in this particular study.  
The pupil prior attainment (known as ‘ability’ in this study) variable is 
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constructed from the average Key Stage 2 (KS2) mark of the child in maths, 
English and science.  Pupils sit these tests in primary school at age 11, so 
scores are independent of secondary school effectiveness.  Documentation 
of the construction of this continuous variable (where marks are re-
calibrated as fractional equivalents of levels) can be found in Levačić et al 
(2005).  Binary indicators for whether a pupil is in the top quintile by ability 
and lowest quintile by ability are also used. 
Pupil and school postcodes are used to place each pupil’s school and home 
address on an OS grid location to within 1 metre of the mean postcode 
position and within 100 metres of the pupil’s home address.  The 
neighbourhood that the pupil lives in is identified by the nested statistical 
areas known as Middle Super-Output-Areas (SOAs), Lower SOAs and 
Output-Areas (OAs).  Middle SOAs contain an average of 78 Year 9 pupils; 
Lower SOAs contain an average of 17 Year 9 pupils; and OAs contain an 
average of less than 4 Year 9 pupils.  These SOAs are intended to contain an 
approximately equal number of pupils, which makes them superior to 
administrative boundaries such as wards. 
The 3,071 schools in the dataset are identified by whether they are a 
grammar, foundation (non-grammar and including City Technology 
Colleges), voluntary-aided (VA) (non-grammar) or single sex school.  The 
default school is a Community (LEA controlled) comprehensive school.
3
  
VA schools are usually owned by churches (two-thirds of which are Roman 
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Catholic), and control their own admissions criteria; foundation schools are 
usually owned by their governing bodies, again controlling their own 
admissions criteria. 
LEA-level data from the 2001 census is used to calculate the population 
density of the area, the proportion of families that are lone parent 
households and the proportion of families where no parent is employed.  
Other census indicators for skills levels in the area were tested but not used 
in the final analysis. 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Method 
A counterfactual to current school admissions 
The policies we label as ‘school choice’ policies in the UK are all intended 
to reduce the strength of the relationship between place of residence and 
school attended.  Therefore, one possible counterfactual to these policies is 
the administrative allocation of pupils to school based solely on a proximity 
admissions criterion.  This study tests two key propositions.  First, that the 
amount of pupil mobility in an LEA depends on the ability of parents to 
access a non-proximity school.  This in turn is related to:
 4
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 population density in the LEA, which indicates the size of the 
potential choice set for parents;
5
 
 the proportion of lone parent families and families where no one 
works in the household; 
 the proportion of schools in the LEA who may be using non-
proximity oversubscription criteria, i.e. grammar, VA (non-
grammar) and foundation (non-grammar) schools. 
Second, that the difference in the level of current school segregation relative 
to segregation under the proximity allocation will be greatest where 
grammar, VA and foundation schools exist.  This may be because 
oversubscription criteria at these schools tend to favour higher income or 
ability pupils.  Alternatively, this may be because school choice strategies 
differ by social background of family. 
If this second proposition holds, we can then infer that the potential to 
reduce school stratification via a policy intervention that institutes a strict 
proximity policy is greatest in areas with many grammar, VA and 
foundation schools.  However, we must accept that residential sorting may 
rise in response; therefore gains in school integration may represent an 
upper bound. 
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The proximity counterfactual is created by computer using the OS grid 
references for pupil and school addresses in the dataset using the following 
rules: 
1. all schools must fill their places on the basis of proximity, with a 
strict preference for pupils who live closer to the school.  All other 
school admissions criteria at schools are removed (though single sex 
schools remain single sex);
6
 
2. school capacity is set as either the current official school capacity or 
the size of the current pupil intake, whichever is greater;
7 
 
3. no parents will be allowed to exercise choice to attend another 
school, even if that school has spare capacity;
8
 
The simulation presented in this report is a two-sided Priority Matching 
Mechanism (see Roth, 1984, for more details):
10
 
1. The first round identifies each pupil’s nearest school and distance 
from home and pupils are allocated to it, provided that there is 
enough spare capacity for them.  If there are more pupils for whom it 
is the nearest school than there are places available, only those 
nearest are allocated. 
2. At the end of the first round, 84% of pupils have been allocated to 
their nearest school.  1,271 of the 3,071 schools (41%) are full to 
capacity and will therefore be excluded from future iterations. 
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3. The second round is similar, but with fewer spare places left at 
schools and only 16% of pupils.  The nearest school for each 
unplaced pupil – out of the schools with remaining space – is 
identified.  Again, pupils are allocated to the nearest school if there 
is enough space to accommodate them, with priority given in strict 
order of proximity. 
The process must be repeated 9 times to allocate all pupils to a school.  At 
the end of the process there are still 33,845 empty spaces at schools (7% of 
all places available at the start of the allocation) because there is spare 
capacity in the system.  Table 2 summarises the key details of distances 
travelled by pupils who are allocated at each stage of the procedure. 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
The simulation does not intend to replicate a real-world situation since this 
type of strict proximity allocation – without, for example, grammar schools 
and church schools - has never existed in England.  Even where proximity is 
now the over-riding allocation principle in an area, many LEAs continue to 
use catchment areas to aid planning and certainty of the allocation process 
for parents.  It is simply suggested that this simulation provides a valid 
mechanism for examining the stratification implications of current student 
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sorting.  This claim is made on the basis that only a tiny proportion of the 
463,117 pupils are required to make unreasonable journeys in the 
allocation.
11
 
Given that almost all grammar and VA schools existed prior to the 1980s, 
two additional simulations are used to provide a better indication of the 
possible role of ‘new choice’ or post-1988 policies in changing pupil 
sorting.  The three simulations are referred to as: 
Proximity I: the proximity allocation where no schools retain 
current pupils (this is the principal simulation and is described 
above). 
Proximity II: a proximity allocation where grammar schools retain 
current pupils (to generate an estimate of between-comprehensive 
pupil sorting). 
Proximity III: a proximity allocation where grammar and VA 
schools retain current pupils (to generate an estimate of between 
non-faith comprehensive pupil sorting). 
Measuring differences in segregation 
Since the outcome of interest in this study is the stratification of a local 
education market under different scenarios, it is necessary to geographically 
define the market.  This study principally relies on LEAs as the area of 
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analysis, despite the high levels of cross-LEA movement between certain 
LEAs, particularly those in London.  The simulation allows pupils to attend 
their nearest school, even if it is in a different LEA to their home or current 
school.  However, the measurement of LEA-level segregation in the actual 
data versus the proximity allocation will often involve slightly different sets 
of pupils.
12
 
Segregation (i.e. the numerical measure of the stratification between two 
groups) between schools in an LEA is measured using the index of 
dissimilarity (D).  In the context of segregation between schools by free 
school meal eligibility, measured at LEA level, the formula for D is: 
I
i
ii
NONFSM
nonfsm
FSM
fsm
D
12
1
 
(1) 
where there are I schools in the LEA; 
school i has fsmi pupils eligible for free school meals and nonfsmi pupils who are 
not eligible for free school meals. 
In the LEA as a whole, FSM pupils are eligible for free school meals and 
NONFSM pupils are not eligible for free school meals. 
 
Segregation by FSM eligibility, by top 20% ability and by the lowest 20% 
ability is measured using D.  In addition the intra-class correlation (ICC) of 
a continuous measure of KS2 ability between-schools in an LEA is used as a 
further estimate of segregation, where ICC = 1 indicates that schools are 
fully stratified because there is no within-school variation in ability and ICC 
= 0 indicates that schools are fully integrated by ability because there is no 
between-school variation in ability. 
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This study seeks to account for differences in the level of actual segregation 
between schools, seg
real
, versus the level of segregation under the proximity 
allocation, seg
prox I
.  It is hypothesised that the size of this difference will 
relate to the level of pupil mobility (i.e. the proportion of pupils who are not 
currently educated in their proximity allocation school) in LEA i, but also 
structural features of the quasi-market: 
iiii
Iprox
i
real
i mobilitysegseg 10  (2) 
iiiiiiiiii
Iprox
i
real
i foundationVAgrammardensitypopsegseg 43210  (3) 
Given the segregation index is 0-1 bounded, there is no clear a priori reason 
to favour the measurement of post-residential sorting as the absolute 
difference in the value of the segregation indices (seg
real
 - seg
prox I
) over the 
proportionate difference in the value of the segregation indices (seg
real
 / 
seg
prox I
).  The rank of LEAs on both the absolute and proportionate 
measures of post-residential sorting will be sensitive to the segregation 
index chosen.  So, both are tested and the absolute difference is selected on 
the basis that it provides more consistent regression results. 
The properties of D and the rationale for its use can be found elsewhere (e.g. 
Allen & Vignoles, 2006), but there are two properties that are highly 
relevant to its use as a dependent variable in a regression and therefore 
warrant mention here.  First, D incorporates a linear payoff criterion to 
unevenness in the distribution of FSM pupils across schools (Zoloth, 1976).  
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If we believe that the effects on social welfare of schools’ having different 
FSM proportions are non-linear, then D can provide us a broadly acceptable 
ordinal ranking of segregation but an inappropriate cardinal measurement of 
amounts of segregation.  The robustness of results to this issue can be 
mitigated to some extent by replication of results using an index, such as the 
Square Root index (Hutchens, 2004), with a highly non-linear payoff 
criterion.  These robustness tests are not reported in this paper, but are 
available from the author. 
A second issue is that the value of segregation under a random allocation of 
pupils to schools will be significantly greater than zero because a single 
school cohort is quite small, and this is generally an issue where a 
segregation index is used as the dependent variable in a regression 
(Carrington and Troske, 1997).  This is known as the ‘random allocation 
bias’, the size of which is a function of the size of the LEA, the number of 
schools in the LEA and the overall FSM proportion in the LEA (Cortese et 
al., 1976).  Randomisation tests (available from author) show that the 
variation is the size of the random allocation bias between LEAs is 
substantial in all single cohort NPD datasets and therefore potentially 
invalidates all existing NPD segregation research that cannot account for 
this.  The random allocation bias is overcome in the specifications described 
above because the size of the bias will be almost identical for seg
real
 and 
seg
prox I
 (since their margins should be approximately the same in the LEA), 
  
19 
thus removing the influence of the bias on the dependent variable seg
real
 - 
seg
prox I
. 
Results 
The level of pupil mobility in LEAs 
The term mobility in this analysis means the extent to which pupils attend a 
different school to their current school in the proximity allocation.  If the 
year 9 pupils in this simulation were re-allocated to schools on the basis of 
strict proximity, 52% of pupils would be placed in a different school to their 
current school.  This is consistent with Burgess et al.’s (2006) indication 
that approximately half of all pupils currently attend their nearest school.  
The median pupil’s distance to school under a proximity allocation would 
be just 64% of the length of their current journey. 
Levels of pupil mobility differ substantially by LEA, as shown in Figure 1.  
Not surprisingly, high mobility LEAs are largely located in or around 
London, with 86% of pupils in Lambeth schools, for example, not attending 
the school they would be under the proximity allocation.  Manchester, 
Liverpool and Birmingham also have high levels of pupil mobility.  By 
contrast, areas where very little pupil mobility currently appears to be 
exercised are more rural, for example Leicestershire (mobility = 15%), East 
Riding of Yorkshire (23%), Rutland (24%) and Cambridgeshire (27%). 
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----------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 3 shows the estimates from the regression to test whether pupil 
mobility in an LEA is associated with particular school or population 
characteristics.  The overall model explains 75% of the between-LEA 
variability in the proportion of pupils who are not at their proximity school; 
population density and all school type variables are significant at 1%.  The 
size of the effect of grammar schools and VA schools is approximately the 
same, which is logical since neither tends give priority to pupils on the basis 
of proximity.  Though the foundation school coefficient is significant, the 
size of the effect on pupil mobility is very small: if 25% of pupils in an LEA 
are at foundation schools, mobility would be estimated to increase by just 
2.5 percentage points.  The effect of population density is so strong that an 
urban LEA with only community comprehensives might have higher pupil 
mobility than a very rural area with grammar schools. 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Fifty-two percent of pupils do not attend their proximity school, yet figure 2 
uses additional simulations and analysis of the pupil’s neighbourhood to 
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establish that the destinations of only around one in five pupils might have 
been affected by post-1988 choice policies (this estimate ignores the 
possibility that changes in capacity at schools have altered the 
‘neighbourhood’ school for some pupils).  It estimates this because many of 
these ‘sorting’ pupils are at grammar or VA schools or are likely to be at the 
de facto neighbourhood school, but this is not identified by the simulations. 
----------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
15 percent of pupils in England are attending a grammar (3%) or VA school 
(12%), and this is not their proximity school.  6 percent of pupils attend 
their proximity non-faith comprehensive (or secondary modern) school, i.e. 
the proximity school in Proximity I is actually a grammar or VA school.  5 
percent of pupils are attending the same school as the majority of pupils 
living in their Middle SOA (or neighbourhood).  We can assert that these 
pupils are highly likely to be attending a designated catchment area school, 
or they are attending a school under a proximity criterion.  An additional 4 
percent of pupils are probably at their school on the basis of 
catchment/proximity criterion because they attend the same school as the 
majority of pupils in the Lower SOA where they live.  Since the Lower 
SOA is smaller than the Middle SOA, this identifies a set of pupils where 
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the Middle SOA is crossing the catchment boundaries for more than one 
school.  However, the use of the lower SOA (which is a small area so can 
have a homogenous social mix) presents a risk of mis-classification of 
pupils, so it might be the case that all the pupils in the SOA are successfully 
‘exercising choice’ to attend a school far away from their homes. 
This analysis shows us that more than half the pupils who are not attending 
their proximity school are either highly likely to be at a neighbourhood 
school or they are ‘choosing’ not to based on criteria available to parents 
before 1988 (i.e. grammar and faith schools).  Whereas Burgess et al. (2006) 
suggested that there is a high level of choice in England because 50% of 
pupils are not at their nearest school, this research places an upper bound on 
pupil mobility due to the new choice policies of 22%.  This appears to be 
more in-line with the only existing study to model exact catchment areas, 
which found pupil mobility of around one-third in an LEA with some 
grammar schools (Parsons et al., 2000). 
Unfortunately, this analysis allows us to do no more than speculate about 
why the remaining 22% of pupils are not at their proximity school.  These 
pupils are more likely to live in London (where they make up 34% of all 
London pupils) and are not, on average, attending schools with a superior 
social mix or ability of intake to their proximity allocation school.  We can 
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hypothesise that these 103,223 pupils are not at their proximity school for 
the following reasons: 
1. Edge of catchment.  Some pupils are attending the same school as 
pupils in the neighbourhood, but the SOA categories could not 
identify this (for example, because catchment boundaries cross the 
SOA).  Half of these unaccounted for pupils are attending the same 
school as over 50% of pupils in the Output Area (but this statistical 
area is very small, so we cannot be certain that it is a neighbourhood 
school). 
2. Family relocation.  Some pupils may have gained their place at the 
school on the basis of a sibling policy, where other members of the 
family were allocated a proximity place because the family used to 
live the area.  Alternatively, the family may have moved house since 
gaining a proximity place in Year 7. 
3. LEA-wide ability banding.  Some pupils are attending a school on 
the basis of a banding system in an LEA or school: this may, or may 
not be, their first choice school.  The four London LEAs who were 
operating LEA banding at the time these pupils entered secondary 
school do have relatively high degrees of unexplained mobility. 
4. Choice without displacement.  Some pupils are exercising choice 
to attend a school other than the proximity school, and have gained a 
  
24 
place at their chosen school via a proximity criterion (or other 
means) because all pupils who live closer either gained a place at the 
school or did not wish to attend it. 
5. Choice with displacement.  Some pupils have successfully 
exercised choice, having been allocated a place at the school via a 
non-proximity criterion such as aptitude (or as the sibling of a child 
who gained a place via an aptitude criterion), thereby displacing 
pupils who live nearer to the school than they do.  There is some 
evidence for this phenomenon in the data: 23% of the unexplained 
mobility pupils are attending foundation schools, versus 18% of the 
population and West et al. (2004) note that foundation schools are 
more likely to have selective admissions criteria than community 
comprehensives. 
6. Displacement due to other’s choice.  If we believe that choice with 
displacement explains a significant proportion of this unexplained 
sorting, then we should expect a significant number of pupils to be 
not attending their (non-faith comprehensive) proximity school 
because they are rejected in favour of pupils who live further away 
from the school than they do, but who gain places on non-proximity 
criteria. 
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School segregation and post-residential sorting 
In this dataset, the weighted mean school segregation in LEAs, measured by 
the dissimilarity index, is 0.29 by FSM and 0.27 by top 20% ability.  The 
level of school segregation differs substantially by LEA, as shown in Figure 
3. 
----------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
The regressions of LEA level school segregation on a set of school type 
variables in Table 4 shows that higher levels of school segregation are 
associated with greater proportions of pupils educated at grammar and VA 
schools (this identifies the possible effect of these schools without 
endogenous residential sorting confounding estimates, but is not a causal 
impact since the supply of school places is not explicitly modelled).  
Foundation schools are also associated with segregation by ability, but not 
FSM segregation in this sample.  As with all regressions reported in this 
study, explanatory variables explain a relatively low proportion of 
variability in FSM segregation and a high proportion of variability in ability 
segregation.  We cannot know whether this is due to the poorness of FSM as 
a proxy for social disadvantage, or whether school types have a clearer, 
more direct effect on ability sorting. 
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----------------------------- 
Insert table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Almost all LEAs have lower school segregation in the simulation proximity 
allocation of pupils to schools (seg
prox I
), the values of which directly result 
from residential segregation.  This is an important finding since it cannot 
easily be reconciled with the suggestion that low income families are the 
principal beneficiaries of policies that reduce the role of residential location 
in school admissions. 
Figure 4 maps the distribution of seg
real
 and seg
prox I
 in LEAs by FSM and 
top ability.  The proximity segregation distribution represents the best 
possible reduction in school segregation by instituting a proximity policy.  
Overall, the weighted mean level of post-residential sorting is 0.05 (s.d. 
0.04) by FSM and 0.11 (s.d. 0.12) by top ability.  In both cases, segregation 
under the proximity allocation is typically lower.  However, several LEAs 
have a lower calculated segregation between schools currently than in the 
proximity allocation, i.e. post-residential sorting is less than zero.  This is 
most likely to be because large numbers of pupils are crossing LEA 
boundaries and so the calculation of segregation contains different pupils in 
each instance, i.e. the LEA is not the valid market.  Alternatively, whether 
by chance or design, these LEAs have catchment areas drawn around 
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schools that do not reflect strict proximity well and result in lower 
segregation. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Explaining levels of post-residential sorting 
There is a positive and significant correlation between levels of mobility in 
an LEA and post-residential sorting by FSM and ability.  These correlations, 
shown in Figure 5, are 0.48, 0.56 and 0.62 for FSM, top ability and low 
ability, respectively.  The outliers by top ability post-residential sorting are 
areas with grammar schools. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 5 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Table 5 shows that LEAs with greater proportions of voluntary-aided, 
foundation or grammar schools have higher levels of post-residential ability 
and FSM sorting.  Not surprisingly, the effect of grammar schools on top 
ability sorting is very high indeed: where grammar schools in an LEA 
educate 25% of the pupils, they contribute to a 0.35 unit increase in top 
ability post-residential sorting.  VA and foundation schools control their 
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own admissions, yet their typical effect on school sorting is different.  VA 
non-grammar schools contribute to higher levels of FSM, top ability and 
bottom ability post-residential sorting than foundation non-grammar 
schools.  All these findings are robust to the exclusion of London LEAs 
from the regressions.  There is relatively weak evidence that post-residential 
sorting is lower in areas of high unemployment. 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
We can see that as pupils succeed in attending a non-proximity school this 
mobility raises school segregation relative to residential (or the proximity) 
segregation.  We can use the proximity allocation to show that pupils who 
are not eligible for FSM are more likely to benefit from current sorting than 
FSM pupils, where ‘benefit’ is defined to mean they improve their peer 
group relative to the proximity allocation.  Pupils who remain in the same 
school following the simulation may not have mobility, but this does not 
mean they do not benefit from sorting.  We can say they will benefit if the 
choice policies produce an improved peer group at the school they currently 
attend. 
One way to illustrate the peer group of a school is as the proportion of 
pupils eligible for FSM in the real data and Proximity I.  Table 6 shows the 
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change in the FSM peer group experienced by FSM and NONFSM pupils as 
a result of current mobility.  61% of FSM pupils are worse off in terms of 
their peer group under current sorting, compared to a proximity allocation.  
Just 13% of FSM pupils have mobility that results in them improving their 
peer group.  By contrast, half of the pupils not eligible for FSM have a 
better peer group under current sorting (and some have a considerably better 
peer group, which is why more than 50% of pupils are worse off in the 
proximity allocation overall). 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
School segregation is said to matter because it creates inequalities in the 
school peer group experienced by children from different backgrounds.  
Standard estimates of the size of the peer group effect suggest a one s.d. 
improvement in a child’s peer group leads to around a 0.1 s.d. in that child’s 
achievement (see Ammermueller & Pischke, 2006, for a recent summary).  
The proximity simulations suggest that the typical child currently 
experiencing a relatively poor peer group (one s.d. below the mean) would 
see this improve somewhat under a proximity allocation to around 0.57 s.d. 
below the mean peer group.  Though this is a meaningful improvement in 
peer group and therefore predictive educational outcomes for the child, it 
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would be wrong to claim that neighbourhood schooling offers a magic bullet 
for lowering social class inequalities in achievement. 
Post-1988 mobility and post-residential sorting 
The prediction of UK school choice researchers has been that the policies 
introduced since 1988 will increase pupil mobility and that this will in turn 
produce greater school segregation.  Two simulations – Proximity II and III 
– can separate mobility likely to have existed pre-1988 from potentially 
newer mobility.  Proximity III allows grammar and VA schools to keep 
existing pupils (to identify the post-residential sorting attributable to these 
schools) and Proximity II separates the contribution of VA schools to post-
residential sorting by allowing only grammar schools to keep existing 
pupils. 
Figure 6 shows that mobility caused by grammar and VA schools can 
explain most of the post-residential sorting of pupils by ability, but they 
explain little of the total FSM post-residential sorting. 
----------------------------- 
Insert figure 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
The weighted mean value of post-residential sorting that might be 
attributable to the post-1988 choice policies is 0.03 for each of FSM, top 
ability and low ability segregation.  This is quite a low figure, but it varies 
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between areas: it is as high as 0.20 in Haringey (by FSM); and 0.28 in 
Wandsworth (by high ability).  Unfortunately this dataset is unsuccessful at 
explaining the between-LEA variability in this measure; detailed admissions 
policies information (not currently available from DfES) would seem the 
best route to understanding the effects of post-1988 choice policies more 
fully. 
In this study the VA and foundation comprehensive schools have 
consistently been associated with greater school segregation and this is 
consistent with the surveys of West et al. (2004) who suggest that many of 
these schools have admissions policies that enable ‘cream-skimming’ of 
higher ability or social class pupils.  By comparing a school’s intake to its 
potential intake if it admitted the pupils closest to the school,
15
 an index of 
‘cream-skimming’ is constructed as: 
1. the FSM proportion currently at school divided by the FSM 
proportion of a proximity-based intake; 
2. the top ability proportion currently at school divided by the top 
ability proportion of a proximity-based intake; 
3. the low ability proportion currently at school divided by the low 
ability proportion of a proximity-based intake; 
4. the mean ability of pupils currently at school divided by the mean 
ability of a proximity-based intake. 
  
32 
The ratio is used to identify the top 10% of comprehensives on each cream-
skimming measure above.  The choice of 10% is somewhat arbitrary, but 
this approach should only be used to identify the schools with a very high 
disparity in intake, relative to a proximity intake, since it cannot identify 
schools that are cream-skimming the middle layer of pupils, i.e. where they 
lose the most able pupils in their catchment to another school, but take 
moderately high ability pupils from other school’s catchment areas.  We 
could also risk labelling a school as ‘cream-skimming’ when in fact their 
current intake was slightly superior to proximity via the chance historical 
construction of catchment areas. 
Table 7 shows us that many schools that control their admissions are 
‘cream-skimming’ to increase their proportion of pupils of higher ability, or 
alternatively limit the proportion of their pupils who are low ability or from 
low income families.  The dataset does not contain admissions criteria so we 
do not know whether cream-skimming can entirely be explained by explicit 
ability selection criteria, or whether more covert selection is taking place.  
This cream-skimming analysis is also consistent with the results from all 
earlier analysis in this study, which has emphasised that the role of VA faith 
schools in producing post-residential sorting is far greater than for 
foundation schools.  VA schools appear to be responsible for well over half 
of all cream-skimming identified here, yet they make-up just 17% of 
comprehensive secondary schools. 
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By contrast, LEA-controlled schools rarely appear to be cream-skimming, 
though it is notable that around one in ten voluntary-controlled schools – 
schools of religious character but where the LEA determines admissions – 
contain a much lower than expected FSM proportion.  Can we use this 
finding to suggest that religious criteria are always likely to produce social 
stratification, but should not produce ability stratification provided a school 
is not covertly cream-skimming?  This finding points to the need to explore 
why FSM pupils have been relatively unsuccessful at accessing their local 
faith schools, even where it is a non-admissions controlling school.  Are 
they less likely to want a religious education for their child, or simply less 
able to demonstrate their commitment to a specific church? 
----------------------------- 
Insert table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
Discussion 
This study has sought to show that we can improve our understanding of the 
impact of school choice policies on student sorting via simulations that 
reallocate pupils to secondary schools strictly on the basis of proximity by 
exploiting the availability of pupil postcodes.  This is a new (and therefore 
imperfect) technique and has not been attempted using NPD before.  There 
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are many routes to improving the simulations: for example, via 
consideration of each school’s relevant geographical ‘market’; by 
accounting directly for partial ability selection by comprehensives in the 
simulation; through repetition over several years to understand the changing 
role of the housing market; and by accounting for the part of the endogenous 
residential sorting that takes place between the ages of 5 and 11 as more 
years of pupil-level data become available. 
Though half the pupils in the study do not actually attend their proximity 
allocation school, much of this can be likely attributed to the shape of 
catchment areas and the presence of grammar and VA schools (i.e. pre-1988 
mobility).  This study estimates that mobility between non-faith 
comprehensive schools is likely to involve no more than one in five pupils 
in England. 
Pupil mobility results from the combination of both the choice to attend a 
non-proximity school and the displacement of local pupils by their 
proximity school and, if successfully exercised, naturally means longer 
journeys to school.  The proximity allocation indicates that the typical 
journey currently made by a pupil is 60% longer than the minimum 
necessary.  In fact, over 5 million kilometres
16
 of additional travel is made 
by 11-16 year olds every school day, either because parents are choosing not 
to send their child to the local school, or because the local school is 
choosing not to give the child a place.  This raises important efficiency 
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issues that are little discussed in the literature.  We should not assume that a 
parent incorporates the external costs of pollution and congestion, even if 
they rationally decide that a longer journey (with the associated time and 
money cost for parent and child) is warranted by the ‘superior’ education at 
the end of the journey.  Furthermore, if school places are highly constrained 
and proximity is not the sole allocation rule, one parent’s rational choice to 
access a ‘superior’ education farther away from home may force a pupil 
local to the school to make a longer journey to an ‘inferior’ one. 
The simulations show that FSM and ability segregation is almost always 
lower in the proximity counterfactual than in the actual data, confirming that 
where pupils are sorting themselves into a non-proximity school, it does 
tend to increase social and ability segregation between schools, relative to 
underlying residential segregation.  This is contrary to the suggestion that 
choice policies are likely to disproportionately benefit low income families 
because they were previously unable to afford homes close to popular 
schools, thus lowering school segregation (e.g. Burgess et al., 2005; Hoxby, 
2003).  In England we did not start from a position of complete residential 
stratification, and in addition we have given schools both the means and the 
motivation to recruit pupils with above average ability and those with fewer 
problems.  In this dataset we find comprehensives that have a pupil intake of 
considerably superior ability and social status to the pupils living closest to 
the school are overwhelmingly VA and (to a less extent) foundation schools.  
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We cannot say whether this can solely be attributed to the overt and covert 
‘cream-skimming’ of more desirable pupils, or whether differential school 
choice strategies and preferences by social class also play a significant role. 
Unfortunately, we cannot use these findings to predict the size of the effect 
that removing discretion over admissions from grammar, VA and 
foundation schools and forcing a strict proximity allocation would have on 
school segregation because this model cannot identify the magnitude of the 
endogeneity of residential sorting.  We can say that a proximity allocation 
has the potential to lower school segregation by the amount that is post-
residential sorting, and the size of this potential reduction is greatest in areas 
with grammar, VA and foundation schools and higher population density 
areas.  However, we do not know the extent to which residential segregation 
will rise in any one area to offset this potential fall, so post-residential 
sorting should be interpreted as the maximum possible reduction resulting 
from a proximity allocation.  It is noteable, though, that areas with grammar, 
VA and foundation schools do not currently have lower residential 
segregation than areas where all schools operate catchment areas. 
About two-thirds of LEAs have a level of post-residential FSM sorting that 
is lower than 0.05, once segregation directly attributable to grammar and 
VA schools is accounted for.  Though the simulations do measure 
significant mobility between non-faith comprehensives in these particular 
LEAs, it would be wiser to attribute this to the inability of the simulation to 
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capture the shape of traditional catchment areas for schools than it would be 
to use this to suggest that these parts of the UK are indisputably achieving 
choice without greater school segregation.  Indeed post-residential FSM 
sorting that might be associated with post-1988 policies is only a weighted 
mean average 0.03 across LEAs.  This very low figure might explain why 
time-series of school segregation reveal so little change over time on a 
national basis.  If policy makers genuinely wish to improve equality of 
educational opportunity in England, this study suggests they should look 
closer at the continuing role of grammar schools, voluntary-aided faith 
schools and, most of all, of the proximity oversubscription criterion in 
producing socially segregated secondary schools. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 7% of this year group transferred to secondary school at the end of year 7 or year 8 
2
 There is some evidence that a pupil’s probability of apply for FSM eligibility status 
depends, in part, on the culture of the school.  This is discussed in Croxford (2000) and 
Shuttleworth (1995). 
3
 In this study, references to community schools will always include voluntary-controlled 
schools since they make up just 2.9% of the schools in the sample and do not control their 
own admissions. 
4
 Spare capacity in the LEA was also tested but never significant, so is not reported here. 
5
 Population density is used as a proxy for the size of the parent’s choice set.  Alternatives 
such as average number of competitor schools within a certain radius (Levacic, 2004) or 
drive-time (Burgess et al., 2006) are relatively highly correlated at LEA level with average 
population density. 
6
 The simulations retain single sex schools since gender is considered a fixed non-SES 
characteristic and so to avoid an upward bias on the effect of population density on mobility 
levels and a downward bias in the effect on sorting. 
7
 Because of the need to exclude certain pupils from the allocation process, e.g. borders, the 
% capacity utilisation for 2000 is first calculated on the basis on total pupils at school.  
Where it is greater than 100%, it is reset to 100%.  Simulation school capacity = pupils 
currently at school who are in simulation / % capacity utilisation. 
8
 The capacity constraint is significant in the simulation to the extent that if every pupil 
were allocated to their nearest school, 41% of schools would exceed their current capacity.  
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Furthermore, if every school is filled to its current size but on the basis of proximity, 23% 
of pupils are allocated to more than one school and 27% of pupils are not allocated at all. 
10
 Many alternative specifications were tested, but do not alter the substantive findings of 
this report. 
11
 For example, 449 pupils would be required to travel more than 5 times their current 
journey distance; 730 pupils would be required to travel over 10 km (though for some this 
is their nearest school). 
12
 Alternative specifications of all regressions were tested using 105 areas created by 
combining LEAs where there are significant cross-LEA movements, but did not alter the 
substantive findings.  Results are available from author for this specification of the model. 
15
 This allocation mechanism is different to others in this study since pupils can be 
allocation to more than one school.  All grammar schools and grammar school pupils are 
excluded from the allocation. 
16
 1.4 million km total distance to school in real data versus 0.9 million km in proximity 
allocation.  Difference of 0.5 million km is multiplied by 2 to incorporate the return journey 
and multiplied by 5 for the 5 year groups. 
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Table 1: Summary of key variables in dataset 
Description Mean S.D. Min Max 
Number of pupils in LEA 
 
5,139 3,559 361 13,157 
Number of schools in LEA 
 
34 25 3 101 
Average population density in LEA 
 
0 1 -0.77 5.82 
Proportion of pupils in LEA currently educated at 
grammar schools 
4% 9% 0% 42% 
Proportion of pupils in LEA currently educated at 
voluntary aided comprehensive schools 
14% 10% 0% 65% 
Proportion of pupils in LEA currently educated at 
foundation comprehensive schools 
16% 19% 0% 100% 
Proportion of pupils eligible for FSM 
 
13% 9% 3% 64% 
Proportion of lone parent families 7% 1% 5% 14% 
Proportion of families with no parent in work 13% 6% 4% 49% 
Mobility = proportion of pupils in simulation that do not 
remain in current school 
52% 14% 15% 86% 
Proportion of LEA’s median pupil's real journey that is 
made in simulation 
64% 12% 31% 95% 
F
S
M
 
Segregation (D) in real data 0.29 0.07 0.13 0.54 
Segregation (D) in Simulation I 0.24 0.06 0.07 0.45 
Post-residential sorting (seg
real
-seg
prox I
) 0.05 0.05 -0.17 0.38 
Post-residential sorting NOT due to grammars 
and VA (seg
real
-seg
prox III
) 
0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.20 
to
p
 2
0
%
 
a
b
il
it
y
 
Segregation (D) in real data 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.71 
Segregation (D) in Simulation I 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.27 
Post-residential sorting (seg
real
-seg
prox I
) 0.11 0.14 -0.05 0.58 
Post-residential sorting NOT due to grammars 
and VA (seg
real
-seg
prox III
) 
0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.28 
lo
w
es
t 
2
0
%
 
a
b
il
it
y
 
Segregation (D) in real data 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.51 
Segregation (D) in Simulation I 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.29 
Post-residential sorting (seg
real
-seg
prox I
) 0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.40 
Post-residential sorting NOT due to grammars 
and VA (seg
real
-seg
prox III
) 
0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.22 
a
b
il
it
y
 
(c
o
n
t’
o
u
s)
 Segregation (ICC) in real data 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.47 
Segregation (ICC) in Simulation I 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.13 
Post-residential sorting (seg
real
-seg
prox I
) 0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.45 
Post-residential sorting NOT due to grammars 
and VA (seg
real
-seg
prox III
) 
0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.18 
Note: summary statistics by LEA, weighted by pupil population 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for proximity allocation procedure 
Round 
Pupils 
needing 
places 
Pupils placed in 
round 
Minimum 
journey to 
allocated 
school 
Median 
journey to 
allocated 
school 
Maximum 
journey to 
allocated 
school 
1 463,117 388,311   (84%) 0.0 km 0.9 km 38.8 km 
2 74,806 47,107   (63%) 0.2 km 2.4 km 25.5 km 
3 27,699 16,690   (60%) 1.0 km 3.6 km 35.9 km 
4 11,009 6,619   (60%) 1.3 km 5.2 km 43.8 km 
5 4,390 2,798   (64%) 2.5 km 6.3 km 44.7 km 
6 1,592 802   (50%) 4.1 km 7.4 km 46.3 km 
7 790 464   (59%) 6.2 km 8.9 km 82.2 km 
8 326 256   (79%) 8.3 km 13.3 km 15.8 km 
9 70 70 (100%) 13.0 km 14.4 km 16.1 km 
 
Table 3: Association between the quasi-market and level of mobility 
Dependent variable = mobility 
Number of observations = 147, weighted for number of pupils in LEA 
Adj. R-squared = 75% 
 Coeff. t-stat    P>|t| 
Proportion of pupils at grammar schools 0.6999 10.43 0.001   ** 
Proportion of pupils at VA schools 0.6147 8.31 0.001   ** 
Proportion of pupils at foundation schools 0.0987 30.06 0.003   ** 
Population density 0.0513 5.49 0.001   ** 
Proportion of lone parent families 1.1384 1.82       0.071 
Proportion with no parent in work 0.0831 0.53       0.594 
Constant 0.2927 7.04 0.001   ** 
Note: * = sig. at 5%; ** = sig. at 1%. 
 
Table 4: Association between school segregation and school types in LEA 
Dependent variable =  seg
real
 
No. of observations =  147 (weighted for number of pupils in LEA) 
 FSM (D) Top ability (D) Low ability (D) Ability ICC 
Adj. R-squared 22% 86% 72% 89% 
Proportion of pupils at 
grammar schools 
 0.320 ( 5.88)  ** 1.397 (28.57)  **  0.696 (17.97)  **  1.055 (32.94) ** 
Proportion of pupils at 
VA schools 
 0.206 ( 3.43)   ** 0.187 ( 3.46)  **  0.203 (  4.75)  **  0.139 ( 3.94)  ** 
Proportion of pupils at 
foundation schools 
 0.030 ( 1.13)  n.s. 0.084 ( 3.56)  **  0.048 (  2.59)  **  0.073 ( 4.74)  ** 
Population density -0.009 (-1.25) n.s. 0.003 ( 0.41) n.s.  0.001 ( 0.20) n.s.  0.002 ( 0.60) n.s. 
Proportion of lone 
parent families 
-0.080 (-0.16) n.s. 1.150 ( 2.52)    *  0.505 ( 1.40) n.s.  0.420 ( 1.41) n.s. 
Proportion with no 
parent in work 
-0.091 (-0.72)    * -0.065 (-0.57) n.s. -0.192 (-2.13)    * -0.050 (-0.67) n.s. 
Constant 0.258 ( 7.65)  ** 0.101 (3.34) n.s.  0.155 (  6.48)  **  0.025 ( 1.24) n.s. 
Note: t-value in parenthesis; * = sig. at 5%; ** = sig. at 1% 
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Table 5: Results from post-residential sorting regression 
Dependent variable =  seg
real
 – segprox I 
No. of observations =  147 (weighted for number of pupils in LEA) 
 FSM Top ability Low ability Ability ICC 
Adj. R squared 33% 90% 82% 92% 
Proportion at grammar 
schools   0.215 (  5.56) **   1.400 (33.35) **   0.686 (23.29) **   1.059 (39.14) ** 
Proportion at VA schools   0.099 (  2.34) *   0.159 (  3.43) **   0.162 (  4.98) **   0.133 (  4.47) ** 
Proportion at foundation  
schools   0.045 (  2.42) *   0.073 (  3.62) **   0.035 (  2.50) **   0.067 (  5.16) ** 
Population density   0.015 (  2.76) **   0.024 (  4.05) **   0.021 (  5.12) **   0.012 (  3.14) ** 
Proportion of lone parent 
families -0.026 (-0.07) n.s.   0.827 (  2.11) *   0.171 ( 0.62) n.s.   0.282 ( 1.12) n.s. 
Proportion with no parent 
in work -0.004 (-0.04) n.s. -0.240 ( -2.46) * -0.208 ( -3.04) ** -0.094 (-1.50) n.s. 
Constant   0.022 ( 0.92) n.s. -0.005 (-0.22) n.s.   0.033 ( 1.79) n.s.  0.005 ( 0.29) n.s. 
Note: * = sig at 5%; ** = sig at 1%;. 
 t-statistic in parenthesis 
 
Table 6: Gains from mobility as measured by change in FSM peer group 
 Worse peer group than under 
proximity 
Better peer group than under proximity 
 % in a different 
school 
% remaining in 
the same school 
% in a different 
school 
% remaining in 
the same school 
Pupils eligible for FSM 
 
29.86% 31.45% 13.3% 25.38% 
Pupils not eligible for 
FSM 
29.16% 20.86% 19.62% 30.36% 
 
Table 7: Cream-skimming by comprehensive schools 
 Proportion of schools identified as 'cream-skimming'  
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 Ratio value for 
cream-skimming 
schools 
by free-school meals 4% 5% 11% 13% 30% 0.00  to   0.55 
by KS2 ability 2% 5% 4% 12% 38% 1.03  to   1.20 
by lowest 20% ability 3% 5% 3% 12% 36% 0.00  to   0.66 
by top 20% ability 4% 4% 3% 13% 33% 1.42  to 15.33 
Number of schools 1,630 281 76 432 480  
Note: Community (Specialist) identifies LEA controlled schools that were given Specialist status in or before 2000 (when these 
pupils entered secondary school).  All Specialist schools could choose to select 10% of pupils by aptitude, though most did not. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of mobility levels across LEAs 
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Figure 2: Understanding why pupils do not attend their proximity school 
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Figure 3: School segregation in English LEAs 
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Figure 4: Current school versus Proximity I segregation 
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Figure 5: Relationship between pupil mobility and post-residential sorting 
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Figure 6: Sources of post-residential sorting 
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